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REVIEW ARTICLE

Reviving Social Hope and Pragmatism in
Troubled Times
SARAH M. STITZLEIN
Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deepening Democracy in Global Contexts.
Judith M. Green. New York, Columbia University Press, 2008. Pp. x 1 292. Hbk.
$34.50, d24.00.

This article commends Judith Green for reviving pragmatism as a
persuasive basis for deepening democracy in her latest book Pragmatism
and Social Hope. It highlights her criticisms of neopragmatist Richard
Rorty and describes the useful directives she provides for developing a
unifying and mobilizing hopeful vision for the future. Finally, it spells out
the educational implications resulting from Green’s inspiring call to
participatory democracy.

Judith Green locates her latest book, Pragmatism and Social Hope:
Deepening Democracy in Global Contexts, as part of a trilogy she is
developing on making democracy stronger and more thorough in large
part through the revival and enhancement of pragmatist philosophy.
Indeed, this volume builds well upon her 1999 work, Deep Democracy:
Community, Diversity, and Transformation, where she tried to ground
democratic institutions more deeply in the everyday aspects of living life
in democracy, including the habits and values of individuals and groups.
In her newest book, she picks up those aspects as she extends her analysis
of citizen participation in a period of crisis following the events of
September 11, 2001. She aims for a democracy that practices ‘unity
without uniformity and solidarity in the midst of diversity’ (p. 159). While
her title expresses her commitment to extending her project into global
arenas now and in the future, the second part of this trilogy is still
grounded firmly in the American experience and origin of democracy as
she emphasises Jeffersonian ideals of the American Founders and
philosophies of the American pragmatists. While her adept, though at
times overly optimistic, philosophical justifications for her work will
appeal to political philosophers and to educational theorists who detect the
strong educational implications that follow from her work, Green seems
most concerned with starting a conversation with everyday citizens and
the public philosophers who guide them. Indeed, she overtly invites these
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people to join in her democratic efforts and in collaboratively constructing
ideas for her final volume in this set.
Combating Richard Rorty and others who claim that deep, citizendriven democracy is not possible, Green appeals to her intended audience
by re-emphasising democracy as not just representative institutions, but
more importantly, as a way of social living. She also carves out a new role
for public philosophers as ‘Socratic midwives to a wider public
conversation of citizen-thinkers that is reflective, reconstructive, and
deeply democratic’ (p. 17). With such a citizen workforce audience, Green
aims to provide ‘a multifaceted, context-sensitive, flexible, open-ended,
constantly evolving, inquiry-guiding story, vision, and process of
deepening democracy that can foster and educate widely shared social
hope’ (pp. 1-2). Her goal, then, is to restore hope in the ability to achieve
deeply participatory democracy through crafting an historically-informed
vision of previous success and a road map for continued improvement in
the future. To do so, she adapts her title and mission from Rorty’s 1999
Philosophy and Social Hope, takes into account global changes following
9/11, and revives pragmatist approaches to work through each.

AN OVERVIEW

Green’s introduction adequately explains why the post 9/11 world offers
both new needs and new opportunities for a hopeful vision to deepen
democracy in the United States and elsewhere. This is done fairly
convincingly, particularly because her global lens is complemented by
increasing moves in the US away from a spirit of retaliation to one of
understanding the role of the US in the world.
As Green moves into the heart of her book, it is clear that she takes her
lead from Rorty’s late 1990s efforts to build social hope, but Green does
not make clear why the reader (as citizen or as philosopher) should
particularly care about Rorty now, or why she spends so much of chapters
two and three critiquing him. It is apparent, though, that whereas Rorty’s
critics ‘accuse him of abandoning the constructive project of the pragmatic
tradition’ (Westbrook, 2005, p. 6), Green resurrects the constructive aspect
of pragmatism while still beginning with Rorty’s storytelling vision. It is
when Green moves away from her focus on critiquing Rorty that her work
becomes more interesting and more effectively guides the kind of deeply
democratic work she aims to produce overall, particularly as she describes
the past and points toward particular future improvements via urban
planning and citizen participation.
Chapter Five’s telling of America’s democratic history, while nothing
new to scholars of democracy, does paint a picture of democratic success
and hope, which can guide newcomers to democratic living around the
globe and revive the commitment to fulfilling a vision of thorough
democracy for those currently living in democratic states.
Overall, Green’s objectives are clear and appear repeatedly, but
usefully, throughout the book to guide the reader. Her chapter organisation
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makes sense and builds nicely, coming to less of a conclusion than an
optimistic starting point for an improved future.

A MORE DETAILED AND CRITICAL LOOK

Green turns quickly to the work of pragmatists Walt Whitman, James
Baldwin, and John Dewey in her first chapter. She uses their work to
suggest ways Americans and other citizens of the world can deal with the
pain and resulting crisis of the 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to offer
ways to move forward that are more inclusive of diverse global
perspectives. She draws upon Baldwin to say that, like many African
Americans who continue to struggle with the legacy of slavery and racism,
we should not forget our 9/11 suffering, but we should forgive and move
forward as we try to coexist with others, some of who have harmed us. She
believes this approach will help break a cycle of violence and anger.
Green’s choice to acknowledge and work through a critical memory,
rather than blocking such a memory as Rorty promotes, does seem more
appropriate, just, and necessary in a world with many unhealed wounds.
Nonetheless, Green’s project of forgiving those who have done harm
could stand to be more fully theorised, perhaps along the lines of likeminded democratic theorist Noelle McAfee who recently described the
struggle of the political unconscious (McAfee, 2008). It seems McAfee’s
analysis could be employed by Green to explain why Americans have
such a need and desire to have their 9/11 pain shared and heard. This may
be the psychological aspect of democratic theory that would balance
Rorty’s ‘uplifting’ psychology.
Green also begins her critique of Rorty by arguing that this healing
process depends on developing unity and pride in one’s country, but not a
pride focused on superiority over others or exaggerated virtues. She shifts
emphasis away from Rorty’s insistence that the educated Left should join
with unions, give up philosophy proper, and build American pride in order
to fight economic inequality and chart a new US future. Green’s project is
notably more inclusive of all global parties (in fact she refuses to use
traditional group labels which have historically blamed specific groups: p.
71) and of multiple goals of improvement for both the US and abroad.
Accounting for this, Green wisely moves from Rorty’s project of
‘achieving our country’ to ‘achieving our world,’ reflecting heightened
global awareness, collaboration, and the shared global project of
democracy after 9/11. But I would like to see her also critique the use
of the word ‘our’, for even as it expresses group solidarity, one current
hindrance to active citizen participation for many people is that they do
not feel joint ownership in the system or even recognition of their lives or
contributions (Levine, 2006). They do not see themselves included in the
‘our’ voiced by a privileged academic.
Her second chapter highlights Rorty’s call for storytelling because she
thinks the process of creating inspiring visions will move the public from
loss to hope. She links the power of storytelling to Native American
r 2009 The Author
Journal compilation r 2009 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain

660

S. Stitzlein

traditions. Though this link is clear, the concluding chapter section
discussing Native American stories feels disconnected from the rest of the
book. Nonetheless, she successfully conveys that Native American stories
are living and powerful, and through them, we can see how a story of hope
could be used to guide the US and the world.
Because Rorty did not have any grounds for his social hope, Green does
not think it will work in a terrorism-filled world that lacks confidence and
seeks assurance. Because of this, Green grounds her storytelling in a thin
process form of ‘pragmatist-socialist’ metaphysics. She obtains the
socialist aspect of her metaphysics from pragmatists who saw it as a
deep form of collaborative connection. She uses this collaborative aspect
to work against dominant individualism in the US today and Rorty’s faulty
image of the American way as the only good way of doing democracy.
Her pragmatist-socialist metaphysics aims to reconstruct experiences in
ways that account for context specifics, thereby allowing for better
understanding of identity formation and communal bonds.
Her pragmatist roots become clearer in the third chapter, as she defines
social hope using Dewey and William James’s accounts of truth
(pragmatist social epistemology, as she calls it) to ground and sustain
that vision via reliable knowledge from multiple perspectives. She casts
this epistemic middle ground between Rorty and fundamentalism. On one
end, Rorty did not think hope needed epistemic foundations and there was
no real need to assess truth claims, while on the other end, a fixed and
comprehensive system of truth would dangerously pit differently believing
groups against each other, rendering them unable to collaboratively work
toward social hope. Green’s struggle will come, however, when she has to
convince a typical citizen that truth should be understood in this multiplyinformed, humanly fallible way. For, as Robert Westbrook points out,
many citizens are religious believers who build their hope and determine
their truths on God rather than on the antifoundationalism of pragmatism
(Westbrook, 2005, p. 160). I would add that this task is even more difficult
in a post 9/11 world of religious fervor in the US and its fundamentalist
opponents.
For Green, social hope arises out of experience, endures struggles, is
related to feeling safe, and entails creative imagination. As social, social
hope involves being concerned for others. As Green defines social hope,
she juxtaposes Rorty’s vision as the imaginative claims of one man with
Dewey’s vision as historically informed and fallible. She does this because
she believes today’s circumstances require not just the national call for
hope that Rorty voiced, but a global vision of deeply democratic living.
This is because when one group (America) puts its efforts toward hope
without regarding the hopeful visions of other people, anti-American
frustration grows, perpetuating cycles of hatred and fear.
Green continues her use of classic pragmatism and its emphasis on
inquiry in the fourth chapter. There she develops a method of social
inquiry ‘to guide cross-culturally inclusive efforts to learn the truth of
history and to rectify outstanding debts from our shared past’ (p. 25). The
most noteworthy aspect of this chapter is Green’s corrective to Rorty’s
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suggestion that we gloss over harmful aspects of our past. Rorty wanted a
vision of hope to exclude bad or immoral acts committed in the past
because acknowledging them would limit a country’s self-respect and
would change the focus from one of hope to one of misdeed and
accusation. Green counters that forgetting the problematic past is not a
good foundation for self-respect and is irresponsible for ensuring that we
do not repeat those acts in the future. Instead, Green argues we need to
retell stories of courage and atrocity from our painful past in order to
recover and move forward, including possibly sharing reparations and
apologies. This move fits with her reconciliatory spirit and with the world
changes over the last decade.
In the fifth chapter, Green distinguishes between a formal, representative strand of democracy and a second deeper and more Jeffersonianinspired strand that calls for ongoing and active citizen participation. She
shows that many leaders and some philosophers have tried to shut down or
belittle the second strand throughout history and even today. Green
provides a sufficiently detailed history of the US to reveal continued
efforts and successes at achieving the second strand. She also suggests
ways the efforts of the past should be interlinked as we move into the
future. Green tells this history in hopes of igniting citizen imagination for
a better and more active future and I believe she is successful in achieving
this.
Green brings participatory democracy into the present in her sixth
chapter by highlighting fruitful locations for such practice, including city
hotbeds of urban planning, environmental groups, storytelling gatherings,
and peace and justice protests. While Green realistically notes the many
obstacles currently blocking citizen participation, she provides empirical
evidence of local urban successes to highlight these locations as places
where citizens can learn and practice participatory democracy well.
Insofar as Dewey was faulted by Westbrook and others for not sufficiently
explaining how to achieve participatory democracy or engage collaboratively in public life, Green’s effort admirably picks up where Dewey left
off.
Green concludes by describing how hope grows via one’s active
participation in democracy, especially during difficult times of loss or
crisis. She brings together Dewey’s ‘meliorism’ and the less well known
‘tragic optimism’ of Viktor Frankl to call for deep democratic
participation in these conditions. A part of this entails more deeply
fulfilling the mission of Green’s first book through the development of
democratic habits, true dialogue, and more genuine publics.

GOING FORWARD

Reading this book shortly after the 2008 US election, I could not help but
be drawn to keywords used both throughout the book and campaigns.
‘Hope’ became a rallying cry and an ideal for Barack Obama. His sense of
creative, collaborative, and citizen-led social progress is intimately tied to
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Green’s definition of hope. Simultaneously, her insistence that hope must
be based in a deep feeling of safety and security (p. 101) also reflected
John McCain’s promise for a protected future. Both of these uses of ‘hope’
appealed to many American voters and spoke to others abroad of
potentially improved US relations. To the extent that Green works so
closely alongside this notion of hope popularised in America and
promotes a form of participatory democracy she describes as ‘distinctly
American,’ she bears the responsibility of better explaining why others
elsewhere should be inspired by or practice this American approach.
The campaign, like Green, also raised a critique of the term
‘intellectual’ as out of touch (p. 83) or ‘elitist and therefore alienating’
(p. 71). Rather than questioning the disregarding of this term suggested by
campaign strategists, or in this case other philosophers, Green follows suit.
She suggests in its place Obama-sounding terms like ‘thinkers’ or ‘active
citizens’ (p. 71). In doing so, she misses out on the opportunity to describe
what role, if any, intellectuals or intellectual endeavors have in telling and
fulfilling hopeful stories. More troubling, Green may contribute to the
dangerous drift toward anti-intellectualism embodied in other US leaders
and mass culture, such as that described by Susan Jacoby (2008) and Elvin
Lim (2008).
Despite leaving behind intellectuals, Green offers considerable
directives for citizens and those she calls ‘public philosophers’ (p. 41).
She puts a heavy load on citizen shoulders as she expects citizens to
undertake the physical and intellectual work of participatory democracy,
but also the psychological work of forgiving terrorists (and perhaps, one
might add, the harm caused to others due to the US response to terrorism).
She asks even more of public philosophers who must lead these activities,
be liaisons between democratic theory and the public, and guide
collaborative inquiry. Where her requests fall short, however, is that she
wants to acknowledge (rather than erase, like Rorty) group diversity, but
she does not go far enough in guiding us through the dirty work of healing
divisions between those groups both inside and outside the US, which
surely includes Baldwin’s remembering, forgiving, and moving on, but
also much more.

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

While Green’s book is not written directly to scholars or practitioners of
education, the educational implications of her hopeful vision are
significant. Schools may be chief places where the story of hope is
constructed and shared. Schools may become responsible for telling an
account of history that is as true to the experience of as many people as
possible and that includes stories of courage and suffering. This may
require a reigning in of an overly celebratory story that many children
traditionally have learned to assume through school plays and books.
Moreover, children themselves must learn the importance of and
approaches to seeking out multiple perspectives on an issue.
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To cultivate and strengthen the hopeful vision of the future that Green
seeks, children must develop imagination and storytelling skills.
Unfortunately, many would argue that these skills are particularly at risk
in many test-driven schools in America and abroad—schools that squeeze
out the arts or cultural and religious sources of stories. Also in jeopardy is
the important step of learning to distinguish what Green calls ‘functional
variants of common humane values’ and ‘democratically intolerable
practices’ (p. 153). These nuanced and morally bound assessments often
fall outside the more fact or skills based teachings popular in many
schools today, but she is wise to bring them to our attention and to
indirectly urge us to incorporate them in curriculum.
Educational researchers and scholars might also consider pursuing other
routes noted by Green. These include conducting more studies in ‘best
practices’ in citizen engagement and studies on representation of diverse
voices in groups, both of which could be particularly interesting during
childhood or in school settings. Additionally, given Green’s enthusiasm
for urban centres as key locations for participatory democracy, educational
researchers might further examine the role of urban schools in this
endeavour and whether pre-service teachers should be prepared differently
for teaching in those locations. Educationists who are champions of
deliberative democracy will find Green’s call to citizen participation
enticing and her focus on a unifying story of hope a potentially useful
rallying point for their growing movement. Finally, Green’s call for
schools to cultivate democratic habits charts a way for educational
philosophers to continue to use the theories of the pragmatists in new and
powerful ways.
Correspondence: Sarah M. Stitzlein, Education Department, University of
New Hampshire, 202 Morrill Hall, Durham, NH 03824, USA.
E-mail: Sarah.Stitzlein@unh.edu
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